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Agreements to Arbitrate and the
Predictability of Procedures
Lawrence W. Newman*
In spite of manifold expressions of enthusiasm for it, international
arbitration is not universally accepted as a means of resolution of
international commercial and investment disputes. According to a recent
survey, there are as many businesses that mostly use transnational
litigation as there are that mostly use international arbitration.' Many of
these businesses may have encountered few disputes because of the way
their commercial activities are conducted, and others may be able to
resolve incipient disputes through negotiation, perhaps involving further
commercial arrangements between the parties.2  Businesses that
frequently use arbitration have been increasingly critical of the fact that it
has become more similar to litigation-particularly US-style litigation in
United States courts-in large part because of increased procedural
activity, including discovery. As arbitration becomes more formal and
more complex, it becomes more expensive.
It is often said that there are business people who have been
disappointed with arbitration, not always because of the results of the
case in which they were involved but sometimes because the procedure
by which the results were reached was different from what they
expected. For example, an American company and a Japanese company
may agree to have their disputes heard in arbitration in Switzerland (a
frequently chosen neutral country) before three arbitrators, two of whom
are chosen by the parties and the third by the parties together, or by the
institution or appointing authority designated by the parties. The
* Partner, Baker & McKenzie LLP (New York).
1. QUEEN MARY SCH. OF INT'L ARBITRATION, UNIV. OF LONDON AND
PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLP, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES
AND PRACTICES 5 (2008).
2. For example, in the author's experience, Japanese purchasers of coal in the
1980s would negotiate greater or lesser quantities of coal to be shipped to them by
suppliers, depending on their needs from time to time. Price adjustments would also be
made. The acceptability of such changed arrangements would, of course, depend on the
needs and alternatives of the suppliers and the purchasers. How such adjustments are
made is not the type of issue that lends itself to resolution in arbitration or courts.
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American company has agreed to arbitration in Switzerland because the
Japanese company has refused to have disputes under the contract heard
in the courts of New York. Conversely, the American company has
declined the invitation to litigate disputes in Japan.
When a dispute arises, the American company, accustomed to
dispute resolution in United States courts, may expect that it will be able
to obtain documents from the Japanese party relating to the issues in the
case. The Japanese company, on the other hand, may believe that the
arbitrators will order limited or no discovery. The parties may have
given little or no thought as to how, for example, the hearings will be
conducted-whether a court reporter will be used and the extent to which
cross-examination will be allowed.
How the arbitration is actually conducted will largely depend on the
arbitrators and their backgrounds, especially on the background of the
person who is selected as the chairman.3  Thus, an arbitrator from
Switzerland (the country from which, in the example above, an
institution may select the chairman) may have spent her formative
professional years presenting cases in Swiss courts, where no discovery
is permitted. She may therefore apply the Swiss no-discovery
philosophy to the American company's requests for the production of
documents from the Japanese party. Indeed, the Swiss arbitrator may
surprise both sides by saying that she sees no need for verbatim
transcripts; her notes (possibly made with the aid of a clerk) of the
testimony and witnesses will suffice. Furthermore, as the case moves
toward hearings, the chairman may announce that she is not interested in
hearing certain witnesses offered by the claimant or respondent. She
may also state that witnesses' testimony must be presented in writing and
that cross-examination of these witnesses will be limited to an hour or
less. One of the parties to the arbitration may like these arrangements
and the other-the Americans-may well be horrified.
In contrast, the Japanese company may be upset at rulings made by
a chairman from the United States, or an arbitrator of another nationality
who is influenced by the American ways of conducting proceedings.
The shock may be especially great when the arbitration grants requests
for the production of internal documents that the Japanese party
considers to be private and confidential and therefore not to be disclosed
to the outside world. Not only will searching for documents be time-
consuming and anxiety-provoking for the party obliged to produce, but
such orders may lead to time-consuming collateral disputes as to
compliance.
3. See Lawrence W. Newman & David Zaslowsky, Chairperson's Role in
International Arbitration is Often Misunderstood, N.Y.L.J. (January 30, 2009).
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However, the two party-appointed arbitrators should have
something to say about the chairman's decisions, should they not? It is
true that the chairman of an international arbitral tribunal can be
overruled by the party-appointed arbitrators, but oftentimes they find it
difficult to do so. One reason is the culture of international arbitration,
under which procedural matters are generally delegated to the chairman.
Moreover, under the frequently used Arbitration Rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce,4 the chairman may decide ultimate
issues if there is no agreement on the part of the other two arbitrators,
with the result that the chairman's procedural rulings may only be
overcome by action taken by both of the other arbitrators, acting
together-something that may well not happen. Thus, although the
parties, or the arbitrators appointed by them, could rise up and protest
such procedural rulings, ordinarily one party sees an advantage to it in a
ruling and it is rare that the approach taken by the chairman is opposed
by both parties.
Consequently, the chairman, as a practical matter, may, on her own,
determine how arbitration proceedings will be conducted, and, in doing
so, she will have considerable influence over such matters as time spent
on the arbitration and, inevitably, the cost of the arbitration. But such
procedural rulings - on such matters as the disclosure of documents, the
hearing or not of witnesses, the scope given for cross-examination, and
time limits for accomplishing certain steps in the proceedings-can, each
of them, have an effect on the outcome of a case.
Is there a way to minimize the risk that the chairman of an arbitral
panel will rule in a way that is unexpected by either or both of the
parties? Answering this question requires reference to a basic principle.
Arbitration is a creature of contract. If the parties did not enter into a
commercial arrangement and include in their contract a clause pursuant
to which they agreed to arbitrate disputes arising out of the contract,
there would be no arbitration and no arbitrators to have an effect on the
parties' commercial lives. This being so, should not the parties be able
to agree to impose a measure of influence over the way in which the
arbitrators, whom they appoint and whose services they pay for, conduct
the arbitral proceedings? More specifically, may the parties, when
fashioning their agreement to arbitrate, include language that will assure
a greater measure of predictability in the process by which their disputes
will be resolved?
4. See International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration,
Rules of Arbitration, Art. 25(l), http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/
Arbitration/other/rulesarb english.pdf.
2009] 1325
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
The problem with this suggestion is that the businessmen and
lawyers who negotiate deals are, understandably, far more concerned
with reaching agreement on the salient commercial terms, such as
amounts to be paid or invested, arrangements for joint ventures (if
applicable), delivery terms, and even price-adjustment clauses, than they
are with dispute-resolution clauses. After all, there is no point in having
discussions about possible dispute resolution unless and until these major
business matters are determined. Therefore, it is often only at the end of
the negotiation process that the business people and transactional lawyers
turn their attention to how possible disputes will be resolved.
Negotiators recognize that failing to address the matter of dispute
resolution in a contract permits either party to seek relief in its home
court. Since neither side wishes to be a victim of such judicial "home
cooking," there may well be a failure to agree on a court where disputes
will be heard. Given the widespread and well known use of arbitration,
the parties then turn their attention to arbitration clauses, and make
contact, often for the first time, with lawyers experienced in international
arbitration. Such lawyers may provide good drafting advice, but
sometimes the negotiators venture out on their own, relying instead on
clauses used in other contracts, often ones that were carelessly drawn and
probably never actually used. These kinds of clauses have become
known as "pathological" arbitration clauses-those that do not work
properly to refer the parties to arbitration. An example of such a clause
is one that the author once had to enforce, which called for disputes to be
heard before the "Official Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France"-
where there is no such chamber. To enforce this clause it was necessary
to request that a Paris court cause the International Chamber of
Commerce to take the case.
Sometimes negotiators are more concerned with arbitration
provisions and take a different approach-constructing elaborate
arbitration clauses that may include provisions for negotiation and
mediation as well as, ultimately, arbitration. Although such clauses may
include provisions that set deadlines and provide for the background and
experience of the persons who may be appointed as arbitrators, they
ordinarily do not deal specifically with how the arbitration proceedings
will be conducted with respect to disclosure and witness testimony. Will
the proceeding be carried out in what is often thought to be the
Continental European way-with limited or no discovery and possibly
restrictions on oral testimony? Or will the parties be given free rein to
obtain documents from one another? As far as hearings are concerned,
will the parties present their evidence through witness statements in
writing in advance of the taking of testimony or will they present their
1326 [Vol. 113:4
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evidence entirely in oral testimony, as is the usual practice in US and
other courts?
These questions point to different categories or ways in which
arbitration proceedings can be conducted. What if parties, when
negotiating a contract, spent a bit more time and agreed generally on how
any arbitration between them might take place? The International
Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR), through its
Arbitration Committee,5 recently published a "Protocol" which, in
addition to presenting suggestions as to the best practices to be followed
relating to document disclosure and witness testimony by arbitrators in
administering arbitration proceedings, also sets forth options that can be
adapted by parties when they enter into an agreement containing an
arbitration clause.6
The Protocol contains three checklists of options-called
"modes"-that can, when one of them is chosen, establish a regime that
will be generally in accord with the parties' understanding and
expectations as to how an arbitration proceeding between them will be
conducted. Use of the checklists will permit the parties to make
decisions, in advance of the existence of any dispute between them, with
respect to three important procedural areas: (1) the scope of disclosure
by one party to the other, (2) the scope of disclosure by the parties to one
another of electronically stored information, and (3) the presentation of
direct witness testimony in written statements and the possibility of the
use of depositions for disclosure purposes. Thus, each of the checklists
permits the parties to select one of three or four modes regarding the
disclosure of documents and the presentation of oral testimony.
With respect to document disclosure from one party to the other, the
four modes set forth in Schedule 1 of the Protocol are as follows:
Mode A. No disclosure of documents other than the disclosure, prior
to the hearing, of documents that each side will present in support of
its case.
5. The author is Chairman of the CPR Arbitration Committee (comprising some
175 practicing lawyers and corporate counsel from the United States and Europe) and
presided over the drafting of the CPR Protocol described herein, particularly Section 1;
dealing with the disclosure of documents, Ben H. Sheppard, Jr., Director of the Dispute
Resolution Center of the University of Houston Law Center, headed the subcommittee
responsible for the portion of the Protocol (Section 2) dealing with the presentation of
oral evidence.
6. The modes refer only to disclosures between parties and not to the process by
which documents might be obtained from third parties-through informal arrangements
with willing parties or pursuant to subpoenas issued, where permitted, by the arbitral
tribunal or by the parties themselves, through their counsel. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C.S. § 7
(2008) (subpoenas by the tribunal) and N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2302(a) (2009) (by an attorney).
2009] 1327
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Mode B. Disclosure provided for under Mode A together with pre-
hearing disclosure of documents essential to a matter of import in the
proceeding for which a party has demonstrated a substantial need.
Mode C. Disclosure provided for under Mode B together with
disclosure, prior to the hearing, of documents relating to issues in the
case that are in the possession of persons who are noticed as
witnesses by the party requested to provide disclosure.
Mode D. Pre-hearing disclosure of documents regarding non-
privileged matters that are relevant to any party's claim or defense,
subject to limitations of reasonableness, duplication and undue
burden.
7
The parties may select one of these modes by including language in their
agreement similar to the following:
The parties agree that disclosure of documents shall be implemented
by the tribunal consistently with Mode [ ] in Schedule 1 to the CPR
Protocol on Disclosure of Documents and Presentation of Witnesses
in Commercial Arbitration.
8
By selecting one of the four modes, the parties can make a choice, in
advance of any dispute, with its inevitable lack of rapport and ability to
agree, on whether they will want disclosure from the other side of
extensive or limited documentation. The first mode, as can be seen,
provides for a scope of disclosure at one end of the spectrum, providing
for no documentary disclosure. At the other end of the spectrum, the
parties can agree, by adopting Mode D in their agreement, to engage in
mutual disclosure that is similar to that which would be permitted in a
U.S. court. The parties' selection of one of these modes is, under the
terms of the Protocol, binding on themselves and the arbitrators and
changeable only upon agreement of the parties or, in extraordinary
circumstances, upon application by one party to the arbitrator.9 Should
the parties not choose any modes, their arbitration would proceed as it
otherwise would; there is no "default" mode.
7. INT'L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION, CPR PROTOCOL ON
DISCLOSURE OF DOCUMENTS AND PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES IN COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, § 1, Schedule 1 (2009).
8. See id. at § l(c).
9. See id. Section 1(c) further provides that: "Any mode of disclosure so chosen by
the parties shall be binding upon the parties and the tribunal and shall govern the
proceedings, unless all parties thereafter agree on a different form of disclosure.
Disclosure of documents different from that which is provided for in the mode of
disclosure selected by the parties may be ordered by the tribunal if it determines that
there is a compelling need for such disclosure."
1328 [Vol. I113:4
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The Protocol also provides, in Schedule 2, for various forms of
electronically stored information. This type of disclosure is treated
separately because it is so potentially vast and complex. The extent of
electronic disclosure as set forth in the modes depends, to a great extent,
on the number of users whose electronic information will be subject to
production and the time period to be covered. These two variables must
be separately addressed if the parties choose to select either of the two
middle modes (Modes B and C). The four modes of disclosure of
electronically stored evidence are set forth as follows:
Mode A. No disclosure by the parties other than the provision of
copies of print-outs of electronic documents to be presented in
support of each party's case.
Mode B. (1) Disclosure, in reasonably usable form, by each party of
electronic information maintained by no more than [specify number]
of designated custodians. (2) Provision only of information created
between the date of the signing of the agreement that is the subject of
the dispute and the date of the filing of the request for arbitration.
(3) Disclosure of information from primary storage facilities only; no
information required to be disclosed from back-up servers or back-up
tapes; no disclosure of information from cell phones, PDAs,
voicemails, etc. (4) No disclosure required of information obtainable
only through forensic methods.
Mode C. Same as Mode B, but covering a larger number of
custodians [specify number] and a wider time period [to be
specified]. The parties may also agree to permit documents to be
obtained through forensic methods.
Mode D. Disclosure of electronic information regarding non-
privileged matters that are relevant to any party's claim or defense,
subject to limitations of reasonableness, duplicativeness and undue
burden. 10
Schedule 2 also provides that, even when one of the three modes (B, C,
or D) is selected providing for some measure of disclosure, the parties
must meet and attempt to work out more specifically how they will go
about sharing electronic information. Thus, Schedule 2 provides:
Parties selecting Modes B, C, or D agree to meet and confer, prior to
an initial scheduling conference with the tribunal, concerning the
10. Id. at § 1, Schedule 2.
2009] 1329
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specific modalities and timetable for electronic information
disclosure.I
The suggested language by which the parties may select one of the
modes in Schedule 2 is similar to the provisions above with respect to
Schedule 1. Should the parties not wish to agree on a mode for
disclosure of electronically stored information pursuant to the schedules,
it is anticipated that the less specific language regarding documentary
disclosures will be applicable to electronic information, although without
the specific guidance provided under Schedule 2.
The Protocol contains a third checklist (Schedule 3), which is
concerned with the presentation of oral evidence at hearings and the
preparation thereof. The modes in Schedule 3 enable the parties to
decide whether or not they will present the direct testimony of their
witnesses by means of written statements or through oral presentation.
These modes further allow the parties to choose whether they will permit
witnesses to have their testimony taken for discovery purposes, in
depositions, outside the presence of the arbitrators.
These modes also deal with witness statements, written
presentations that are frequently used in international arbitration, to take
the place of direct testimony of witnesses. Such statements are not
commonly used in domestic US arbitrations, but the Protocol suggests
their use in the interest of speed and economy. On the other hand, it is
virtually unheard of for an international tribunal sitting outside the
United States to order depositions of witnesses for the sole purpose of
permitting one party to learn more about the other side's case. In the
United States, however, such depositions are often used in arbitrations.
Thus, the expectation of parties with respect to the presentation of
witnesses may vary. Confronting these differences by considering the
application of one of the modes of Schedule 3 may well cause the parties
to face, early on, how they want this aspect of their arbitration to be
conducted. The modes of Schedule 3 are as follows:
Mode A. Submission in advance of the hearing of a written
statement from each witness on whose testimony a party relies,
sufficient to serve as that witness's entire evidence, supplemented, at
the option of the party presenting the witness, by short oral testimony
by the witness before being cross-examined on matters not outside





Mode B. No witness statements. Direct testimony presented orally
at the hearing. No depositions of witnesses.
Mode C. As in Mode B, except depositions as allowed by the
tribunal or as agreed by the parties, but in either event subject to such
limitations as the tribunal may deem appropriate.12
A mode may be selected in the arbitration agreement through the
use of language in the Protocol that is similar to that by which the parties
may select modes from Schedules 1 and 2.
The Protocol is also intended to be applicable after arbitral disputes
arise, if the modes have not been previously selected. Although parties
are often thought to be less likely to agree on matters once a dispute
between them arises, experience shows that there exists the real
possibility that they may, at or around the time of the commencement of
the dispute, be willing to direct their attention to procedural matters the
resolution of which may be in their mutual interest. It may well be that,
even if parties cannot agree on the identity of the chairman-although
they often do-they may, as they proceed toward arbitration, be willing
to agree on such fundamental matters as those that are covered by the
modes. Thus, the commencement of the arbitration presents a second
opportunity for the parties to shape the general nature of the proceeding
in which they will be involved.
There is a school of thought in international arbitration that is
resistant to the policy underlying the Protocol and its modes. This is the
position, often taken by many more experienced arbitrators, particularly
in Europe, that there is no need for advanced determination as to the
scope of the arbitration proceedings. Rather, they would say,
experienced arbitrators and counsel can, working together, organize an
arbitration that is suited to the circumstances of the particular case.
Some would go further and say that there should be no encroachment by
the parties on the latitude given, under arbitration rules and practice, to
the arbitrators to organize the proceedings by which they will receive
evidence. This way of thinking evidently has its roots in civil law court
procedures under which the judges play a significant role in the obtaining
of evidence and in the questioning of witnesses. Under this approach,
taken to its extreme, the parties are subject to the total control of the
arbitrators, even though the arbitrators obtain their authority through an
agreement reached by the parties.
It is this paternalistic approach to arbitration that is at the core of the
concerns of users of arbitration who are drawn to the limitations
represented by the CPR Protocol, which are designed to keep the
12. Id. at § 2, Schedule 3.
2009] 1331
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arbitration under the control of those who created it-the parties-and to
prevent unpleasant surprises when the arbitrators, by reason of their legal
training, experience or otherwise, want to proceed differently from the
way the parties do. Another reason that the approach of the Protocol is
finding acceptance is the sense, among corporate parties, that once a
dispute has arisen and litigation lawyers become involved, there is an
impulse on the part of those lawyers to do everything they can to succeed
in the arbitration. This attitude is seen as fostering a strategy of "leave
no stone unturned" in preparing one's case-even if such preparation
means increased disclosure and more prolonged hearings. Having the
procedural scope of arbitration proceedings determined early on, before
the parties see advantages in proceeding in a different way, can enable
the parties to have any differences that arise between them heard in a
procedural setting that is familiar to them-and, what is more important,
is in accord with their expectations.
